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Expecting Many 
Tim Fernando and Hans Karnp 
University of Stuttgart 
Abstract . The determiner many is analyzed relative to a notion of 
expectation that is introduced into contexts employed in the theory 
of generalized quantifiers. Issues concerning intensionality, vagueness, 
ambiguity and context change are considered along the way. 
1 .  Introduction 
The semantics of t he determiner many can be specified within generalized 
quantifier theory as roughly 
many(A. B)  iff I A  n B I  > n ( i )  
for some suitable lower bound n o n  the cardinality IA  n B I o f  the set o f  A's 
that are B's .  What is "rough" about ( i )  is n .  an early proposal for which (due 
to Barwise and Cooper [3] ) is 
n = max ( n ' . k ·  I A i )  
for some number n ' and fraction k (between 0 and 1 ) .  Motivated largely by 
Milsark 's u'eak/strong-classification of determiners ( according to which only 
weak determiners can occur in th ere- insert ion sentences ) .  Partee [ 1 1 ]  argues 
for a decoupling of n' and k . I A I .  yielding two different readings of m a n y :  a 
weak cardinal reading. given by ( i ) . with n supplied by the context : and a 
strong proportional  reading 
m a n y ( A .  B )  iff 1 ..1 n BI > k · 1 ..1 1  ( i i )  
when' t h i s  t ime t he context cont r ibutes k .  Cnder the assumption that a choice 
of context fixes t he parameters n and J,: independently of the arguments A and 
B of m a n y .  read i ngs ( i )  and ( i i )  can t hen be differenti ated through various 
semant i c  propert ies .  An example i s  sym m f i r y :  the condi t ions m a n y ( A .  B )  
and m a n y ( B .  A )  arc e\' ident ly equ i \'alent  under ( i )  but not under ( i i ) . 
But what do such j udgment s amount t o .  gi ven t he underly ing prem iss 
t hat n and k are determined by cont ext . i rrespect ive of the arguments A 
and B of m a n y ?  The quest ion is somewhat del icate .  as ( i )  or ( i i )  can only 
be defended by abst ract ing away t he vagueness in m a n y  t hrough a highly 
idea l i zed not ion of cont e x t  t hat picks out a prec ise value for n or k. \'agueness 
aside. howe\·er .  wou ld i t  not be usefu l  to have a not ion of context where eit her 
( I a )  or ( I b )  cou ld be u t t ered t ru t hfu l ly. even if the talks had an ident ical 
aud ience ( numberi ng fcwer t han a hundred ) ?  
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( 1 ) a. Many people came to our talk. 
b. Not many people came to Chomsky's talk. 
Perhaps more crucially, there is the matter of logical consequence, character­
ized customarily by universal quantification over (fixed) contexts 
tP is a logical consequence of <p iff for every context c, 
if <p is true at c then so is tP . 
With a view to shedding light on these points, the present paper investigates 
cases in which some notion of norm or expectation determines just how many 
is many. We do not claim that all uses of many can be explained along these 
lines (a question taken up at some length in §3. 1 below) .  Even so we believe 
that it is instructive to inquire into how n and k might , in certain cases , arise. 
1 . 1 .  The fixed context assumption and extensionality 
Let us begin with a remark from Barwise and Cooper [3] about generalized 
quantifier theory, which brings out a number of issues that will concern us. 
One of the simplifying assumptions often made in the model theory is 
that one has a fixed context which determines the meaning of the basic 
expressions. We can think of this context as providing an interpretation 
for non-logical determiners . . .  In this paper we shall assume t h roughout 
that there is a rich context held fixed that determines the precise mean­
ing for basic expressions, even those like " most" , "many" and "few" . 
We refer to th is as the fixed context assumption . . . .  The fi xed context 
assu m ption is our way of finessing the vagueness of non-logical deter­
miners .  We t h i n k  t h at a theory of vagueness like t h at given by Kam p 
[ 1 975] for other kinds of basic expressions could be su perim posed on our 
t h eory.4 \'\'e do not do this here. to keep things manageable . 
We wil l  t urn to Kamp [6] and footnote 4 short ly. but for now let us note 
t hat ( presumably "to keep th ings manageable" ) Barwise and Cooper [3] focus 
on determiners Q .  for which the t ru th  condit ions of Qx (.p . I.' )  i s  given by a 
relat ion between the x-ext ensions {x  : .p }  and {x  : I; ' } of .p and 1,' . Such 
a scheme would appear inadequate for many .  however. as i l lust rated by the 
aforement ioned pair ( 1 ) . and even earlier by the pair ( 2 )  from Keenan and 
S tavi [9] (which argues for non-extensional i ty at the first argument of many ) .  
and ( 3 )  from §4 . 4 . 4  of Kamp and Reyle [8] ( which argues for non-extensionality 
at m a n y 's second argument ) .  
( 2 )  a .  !\Iany lawyers at t ended t he meet ing th i s  year . 
b. l\ lany doctors at t ended the meet ing th is  year . 
( 3 )  a. !\Iany houses i n  X burned down last year. 
EXPECIlNG MANY 
b. Many houses in X were insured against fire last year. 
In all these examples, the reasoning is the same; evaluate the pair many( .4, B) 
and many(A' ,  B')  under the assumption that argument A is c<rextensional 
with A', and B with B', but assign many(A, B) and many(A' ,  B') different 
truth values on the basis of different expectations for A n  B and A' n B'. 
In reply to these arguments ,  Partee [ 1 1 ]  minimizes the non-extensionality 
of many, pointing out that "the only element of value judgment that may have 
to enter into the interpretation of simple many and few may be in determining 
a suitable value for n or k in the given context ; but each such meaning, once 
n or k is fixed, is clearly extensional. "  Sweeping non-extensionality under the 
rug of context , she proceeds to compare the situation with past attempts "to 
establish whether relative adjectives like tall and expensive are intensional (like 
good) or, as Kamp ( 1975) suggested and Siegel ( 1 976) convincingly argued, 
vague context-dependent extensional adjectives ." While we are a little unclear 
which passage in Kamp [6] lends itself to this interpretation , l  the relevance of 
vagueness to many is obvious enough; as Partee observes, 
In normal usage it seems that we do not expect the context to narrow 
down the choice of n to a single precise value, but only to narrow it 
down enough to be communicatively useful.  
Now, if many is , as Partee contends , "clearly extensional" "once n or k is 
fixed," then why dwell on the non-extensionality of many, when that non­
extensionality can be confined to parameters n and k that are indisputably 
vague? Should we expect a precise story about how n or k get determined. 
when they, i n  fact , do not get determined precisely? Without a clear concep­
tion of vagueness ,  the matter is  bound to remain vague . 
1 . 2. 1 aguen ess and context-dependence 
The analysis of vagueness in Kamp [6] is put very concisely in footnote 4 in 
Barwise and Cooper [3] . 
Kam p 's proposal is basically to eval uate  a sentence wit h respect to a 
c lass of models.  rat her  t h an a si ngle model . 
Although t here is a bi t  more to Kamp [6] . th i s  suffices to make the point that 
Claim 1 .  One n eed not worry about  losing nlguen ess by posi ting models that  
resol\'e i t  away: \agueness can be recD\'ered by constructing a con t ext from 
a family of s u ch models ( being careful to dis tinguish the not ion of a con text  
from that of a model) .  
Kamp [6] act ual ly analyzes vagueness more directly in  terms of a part ial modeL 
and passes to complet ions of it ( corresponding to the aforementioned "family 
of such models" ) in  order to define a probabil i ty funct ion on sets of these. A 
function C is assumed that narrows t ruth gaps when fed a context .  although 
not much i s  said about j ust what a context is, let alone where the function C 
comes from. 
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1 . 3. Partee 's adjectival and determiner readings 
Returning to the word many, let us record Partee [ l lrs analysis, before pre­
senting our own. The cardinality reading ( i )  is exemplified by assigning (4) 
the discourse representation structure (DRS)  
x 
Many(X) 
Student s(X) 
Arr-today(X) 
where X ranges over plural objects .2  
( 4) Many students arrived today. 
(iii) 
Line (iii ) treats many as an adjective, reducing many A '8 B to there are many 
A n B  's , according to what Keenan and Stavi [9] call an existential reading . By 
contrast , under the proportional reading (ii) , (4) is represented as the duplex 
condition 
x 
arr-today( x)  ( i v )  student(x)  
where Q i s  many. 
2 .  Intensionalizing many 
Interpretat ions ( i )  and ( i i )  can be expressed, with the sets A and B replaced 
by formulas 'P and 1/.' . as 
Many  x ( 'P, �, ) iff V ( ( 3 �nx ) ( ", 1\ 11-' ) 1\ n-is-manyx ( 'P ,  It ) )  
n� l 
( v )  
where 3�nx abbreviates ··there are at least n x ' s " and n-is-many  x ( 'P .  v )  intu­
i t ively expresses t hat " n  is m a n y .  for 'P-x 's sat isfying l.' . "  The first conjunct 
( 3 � n x ) ( 'P 1\ l.' )  in the right hand s ide of ( v )  is  a st raightforward existent ial 
claim.  the verification of which requires only the extensions of 'P and l,' ( which 
are . i n  turn . t reated in a symmetric fashion ) .  The thorny conjunct is  the sec­
ond ;  it is here where l ines ( i )  and ( i i )  diverge. Under the existent ial reading 
associated with ( i i i ) .  t he two argument s ( 'P and l.') of n- is-manyx can be com­
bined by conjunction . reducing our specificat ion of m a n y  to a unary predicate 
n- IS-MANY x ( appl ied to '" 1\ l.' ) describing m a n y  as an adj ective 
n- IS- M A N Y  x ( '" 1\ l.' )  iff n-is-many  x ( 'P ,  1/.' ) . 
On the other hand. for the determiner reading ( i i )  of m any .  we wil l  need both 
argument places of n-is-manyx ' 
EXPECTING MANY 
2. 1 .  Treating many a s  a unary predicate 
The adjective many is analyzed in (iii) not only as extensional but also as 
intersective .  While this may do relative to a notion of context that fixes the 
bound n in (i) independently of the arguments of many, the matter becomes 
quite different if the arguments are allowed to contribute to the calculation 
of the bound. These contributions must be encoded into the meanings the 
context assigns to the arguments and supplies when evaluating the utterance. 
Claim 2 .  The context at which a sentence is uttered does not alone determine 
n in ( i ) ;  n depends also on the arguments oEmany, which cannot be interpreted 
simply by their extensions. 
Claim 2 is crucial to our analysis , which proceeds from 
Claim 3. n C 's are many when I C I  could well have been < n .  
More concretely, we offer a formalization o f  "could well have been" by proba­
bilities . But what should the probabilities be defined on? Should the variable 
x used up in making the factual assertion "there are � n x ' s" be reintroduced 
again for calculating probabilities? This approach is blocked by. for instance. 
the Keenan and Stavi [9] example ( 2 ) ,  which requires different measures for 
lawyers and doctors. even when they happen to be co-extensional .  That i s .  
Claim 2 essentially yields the corollary 
Claim 4. Defining probabilities on objects is inadequate to capt ure expecta­
tions behind many . 
The basic intuit ion about what a norm is in the cases which concern us should 
make clear in which direction we have to look : for alternat in> si t uat ion s .  or 
possible worlds .3  Accordingly. let us formalize Claim 3 in t erms of a probabi l i t y  
function p on sets of worlds ( w . . . . ) by the equivalence 
n- IS-MANYr ( \ )  iff " i t  i s  probable t hat ( 3 < n I k' 
iff p( { tc : I \ l x .", < n } » c  
where 1 \ l x .u is defined to be I { I : \ in tt· } ! .  For now . If't liS aSS ll l l l t ·  on l y  t h a t  
p and c are fixed by t he model ( i ndepf'ndent ly of \ ) . and rd a t t ' 0 1 l r  a n a l y s i s  
of  ( v ) to  ( i ) :  
Many r ( y . l ' ) iff V ( ( 3� n I ) ( y A V ) A p{ { u· : I .,: A v I I . "  < I I } » C )  
( , i ) 
where. by defini t ion . I \ I I = I { x : d l  - assuming whell  1 I0 wor l d  i s  s pt ' c i fied 
that evaluat ion is carrif'd out at t he act ual world -- and 
_ { min{ n :  p( { u' : 1 \ l x . u < II } ) > c} n " .x - x if 3 11 p( { u ' : 1 \  I .T . "  < I I } ) > ( ot herwise. 
As noted by C. Condoravdi .  we lose the empiri cally problell lat ic ent ai lments 
( .5 )  and ( 6 )  pred ic tf'd in Partee [ 1 1 ] .  under which many is ( OI l  i t s  ca rd i n al i t y 
reading ) pers i s tent and monotonic .  
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There were many beach front houses that were flooded last 
year; thus , there were many houses that were flooded last year . 
There were many students that came to the talk and asked 
questions ; thus , there were many students that came to the 
talk. 
Monotonicity and persistence break down because if either argument , 'P or 1/! .  
i n  Many x(rp, 1/!)  i s  weakened, the probability p({w : Irp l\ 1/! lx,w < n} ) could well 
fall below c, raising n",I\1jJ,x ' (The failure of these properties is unaffected by a 
strengthening of X ::> Xl to 0 (X ::> Xl) . ) 
On the positive side, a property that we may wish to meet is illustrated 
by (7 ) ,  assuming for simplicity that there were at least two such houses . 
(7 )  Many houses in X burned down last year ; in  fact . all houses 
in X burned down last year. 
An account of the felicity of the use of in fact above requires a different ( non­
cardinal) reading of many. 
2.2 .  Treating many as a binary relation 
Turning to the duplex analysis ( iv ) .  note that the discourse markers intro­
duced by the restrictor remain available within the nuclear scope. In cases of 
intensionality, the contextual update may consist also of narrowing the col­
lection of possible worlds on which probabilities ( and 7 1- is-manYr ( Y '  v ) )  are 
defined. Recall that the conditional probab ility p( X I Y )  of X gi t ' f 71 L defill t'd 
as p(;;r) provided p( Y )  =I- 0 (undefined . otherwise ) . is designed t o  adj us t  t hp 
probabi l i t ies p to a domain obtained by intersect ion w i t h  L 
Claim 5 .  ( 'n der a construal oEmany as an in tensional q l la n t ifier. t lw r('s t ri c t or 
m ay change the proba bili t ies within i ts  n u clear SCOpf' hy ('( J l J (li t iona liza t ion . 
Asymmetry may t hen arise from ( local ) context ch an g( '  
n-is-manyx ( "" l' ) iff " i t  is probable. given t her(' a n '  1 .; l r ';- J ·s .  
t hat 3 < n J ( ",  1\ v )" 
i ff p( { tI, : 1 ", 1\ v l r . u  < 11 } 1 { 1l ' : 1 .; l r " = 1 .; l r } ) > c . 
Note that all ",-J 's count t he same when relat iv iz ing t o  t i l < '  con d i t  ion 1 .; l r . "  
1 'P l x ' A minor emendat ion is suggested by  certain ( adm i t IPd ly )  m a rgi n rt l  cas('s 
l ike ( 8 ) .  in which there i s  a logi cal connect ion bel \\'('en t he a rgu l lH'n t s of m a T / y .  
( 8 )  a .  l\ lany A ' s  are .-1 .  
b .  !\lany .-1 ·s are not .-1 .  
EXPECTING MANY 
To validate sentences of the form (8a) , let us add the disjunct " 1.1 n BI could 
not have been > n" (taking both < n and > n into account ) ,  so that 
n-is-manYx(If', 1/I)  iff p({w : 11f' 1\ 1/I Ix,w < n} l lV.,o,x » c or 
p({w :  IIf' I\  1/I lx,w > n} lnr'l',x ) = 0 (vii ) 
where W'I',X is an abbreviation for the set {w : Ilf' lx,w = Ilf' lx} ' The additional 
disjunct would, for the case n = 0, make absurd sentences of the form (8b) 
true - but fortunately (v) skips over n = 0.4 
Note that we have derived an asymmetric reading from a symmetric one 
via conditionalization, without making reference to the fraction k in line (ii ) .  
One candidate for k i s  the relative frequency WI of B (where V i s  the set of all 
objects )  considered in Westerstahl [ 14] . However, instantiating (ii )  with this 
value yields the symmetric reading 
many(.1, B) iff I B I IA n B I > WI" 1.1 1 . 
The idea that some notion of frequency is related to the proport ional read­
ing carries, nonetheless, some plausibility. Commenting on the proportional 
reading, Partee [ 11 ]  writes 
One subtlety that deserves further investigation is that when the re­
strictor does involve a very open-ended set , " proportion" . . .  becomes 
ill-defined ,  and some extended sense of " frequency" may be needed , 
including an atemporal sense conceptualized in terms of an imagined 
su rvey of the given domain . Proportion proper may then be viewable 
as a special case of frequency. 
It is instruct ive at this  point to return to our discussion in §2 . 1  of probabil­
ities and ( non- )extensionality. Notions of frequency underly a conception of 
probabil it ies defined on ( sets of ) objects ( in .  for example. a first-order model ) .  
as opposed t o  subjective not ions o f  belief which lead t o  a definition of prob­
abi l it ies on ( sets of ) possible worlds . Now .  in Partee 's "imagined survey" . it 
is .  according to Claim 4 ( in §2 . 1 ) . the sampling situat ions ( completed into 
worlds ) on which probabil it ies should be defined. Thus . rather than taking 
t he condi t ional probabi l i ty p( B I A ) on ( set s )  of objects .  let us introduce for 
every property A.  a generic constant aA . and calculate on worlds 
PA.B = p( { w : [aA] ", E [B]w} l { w : [aA] ", E [A] ", } ) . 
t he point being to instant iate ( i i )  with k = 0 . PA.B for some coefficient 0 
( chosen . l ike c. independently of A and B )  
many ( A . B )  i ff  1 .4 n B I > 0 . PA .B · 1 ..1 1 ( vi i i ) 
( w here 1 .4. 1  is the cardinality of the  extension of A at the actual world .  and 
similarly for I A  n B I ) .  But now how does this proportional reading relate to 
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the one given by line (vii) above? It is certainly not our intention here to 
argue that (vii ) and (viii ) represent different readings of many. On the other 
hand, there is no denying that for a fixed model , line (vii) may well specify 
an interpretation of many different from that under (viii ) .  We conjecture, 
however, that discrepancies at individual models evaporate once we turn our 
attention to what is valid at all models satisfying certain natural conditions. 
These conditions concern the ingredients p, c and (} employed above. about 
which we have so far been deliberately vague. 
2. 9. Some loose ends 
Turning to the numbers c and (} that quantify just how well is " well" in Claim 
3 (i .e . , n C's are many when I C I  could well have been < n ) ,  let us first observe 
that the passage from §2 .1  to §2.2 via conditionalization can be strengthened 
(i .e . , reversed) , provided the same values for c and a are used in analyzing 
the cardinal and proportional readings . More precisely, observe that we might 
derive a cardinal reading from a proportional reading by stipulating 
n-IS-MANY,,{X) iff n-is-many,, (x = x , X ) . ( ix)  
Claim 6 .  Tbe unary predicate many (in §2. 1 )  can be deril'ed [rom tbe binary 
relation many (in §2.2) by putting tbe common noun predicate in tbe nuclear 
scope. 
Claim 6 asserts that the cardinal reading from line (vi )  ( in §2 . 1 )  can be ob­
tained from line ( ix ) ,  under the definition of n-is-manYr specified by line ( vii) 
or ( viii) (in §2 . 2 ) .  Again . such equivalences may not hold at any fixed model. 
but only between certain models where the cardinality I V I  of the universal set 
l' is sufficiently larger than IC I  (and 1 .4 1  and I B I )  so that the restrict ion to 
worlds with a fixed cardinality has no effect on our expectations about (' (or 
.4 or B ) .  
A consequence o f  Claim 6 of  potent ially wider l inguistic interest i s  the 
suggest ion that an existent ial reading of Many  x ( ." .  IP) moves ." over to be 
conjoined with lj' - rather than tP over to <.p .  That is . 
th ere are many C 's iff m any (  l '. C )  . 
instead of the equivalence 
th ere are many C 's iff many (  C. q 
adopted ( for instance ) in Partee [ 1 1  J .  5 
Next . let us consider what the values of c and a are . Why not simply set 
c = t and a = I ?  It is  useful here to compare the determiner many with 
most . 
( 9 )  a .  Many .4 's B .  Many .4 's not B .  
EXPECTING MANY 
b .  Most A's B. Most A's not B .  
c .  There are many A's .  
(9a) is satisfiable, whereas (9b) is not . But cardinalities and probabilities 
measure sets in a similar way insofar as IA - B I = IA I - IA n B I  and p(X - Y) = 
p( X) -p( X n Y) (switching here from A and B to X and y,  in order to remind 
the reader that we define probabilities not on sets A and B of objects but on 
sets X and Y of possible worlds) .  It follows that (9a) cannot be satisfiable 
under a proportional reading (vii ) where c = t or (viii) where a = 1 .  Under 
the cardinal reading (vi ) ,  (9a) would imply (9c ) .  But do we always want to 
infer (9c) , given (9a)? 
With a bit more work, we might argue that for any positive integer m ,  
i t  would be  wrong t o  require of all models that c and a be  greater than �. 
Consider an election with say, 2m candidates , Cl , C 2  • • •  , C2m . 
( 10 )  Many of the women voted (only) for candidate Ci . 
For m + 1 (of the possible 2m) sentences in ( 10) to be simultaneously satisfiable 
under a proportional reading (suggested by the partitive construction) ,  we need 
a threshold C (or a ) below �. 
Although this argument loses i t s  plausibility as  m approaches infinity. it 
would seem prudent to think twice about fixing C or a once and for all . But 
if c and a are not fixed, how do they vary? If c or a were to depend on either 
argument A or B of many(A. B ) ,  then we would have complicated many with 
intensions .  only to shove the prob lem of n ' s  and k's dependence on A and B 
( i n  ( i )  and ( i i ) )  over to c and a .  We must i nstead resort to the assumption that 
variations in values of c and a can be accounted for by variations in models .  
Furthermore. such values must . at any model , be constant . 
Intensional ity Hypothesis . There are enough possi ble worlds differen tiat­
ing distinct  properties so that  c an d a n eed not depen d on the  arguments of 
many . b u t  can . for any gi\'en model. s tay fixed. 
The Intensional i ty Hypot hesis is very possibly the most problemat i c  ( and in­
terest ing )  point of the present work . Can any two judgments n- is- m a ny x ( ", . Ii' ) '  
and n- is-manYr ( Y' .  (.:' ) be glued together by a common bound c or a ?  Or 
are probabi l i t ies defined on total worlds overk i l l ,  i n  which case would we be 
bet t er advised to  base our est imat ion of when n \ -x 's are many  some other 
way '� What mat ters ult imately. we believe .  is not so much the interpretat ion 
of m a n y  at any part icular model , but rather the val id i t ies and rules predicted 
by quant ifying over a su i table collection of these models ( wi th  d ifferent p ·s .  c's 
and a ·s ) .  These val idit ies and rules may turn out to be so tr iv ial as to admit a 
s impler non-probabi l ist ic semant i c  interpretat ion . pushing the el imination of 
numbers from probabi l i t ies in Segerberg [ 1 3] further. l1nfortunately. we must 
leave t he development of such technical points to another paper. 
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3. Discussion 
The fundamental intuition about many on which §2 rests is expressed by Claim 
3, n C 's are many when I C I could well have been < n. It is natural to interpret 
the phrase "could well have been" relative to what we know about C, which , 
comprising only a small part of the information encoded in the actual world, 
leads to so-called subjective probabilities , requiring ( in turn) an intensional 
framework.6 
3. 1 .  Expecting many readings 
While it is plausible to assume that expectations must ultimately be grounded 
in the actual world, exactly how that comes about is undoubtedly an extremely 
complicated story. We need not spin such a tale, however, in order to give an 
extensional analysis of many that goes beyond simply assuming that context 
spits out n. A step in this direction is to follow Lappin [ 10] and add a com­
parison set argument to many, turning it into a ternary predicate ambiguous 
between 
and 
manYl (A, B, C) iff IA n B I > IA n C I 
manY2(A.,  B, C) iff IA n B I > I B n C I  . 
suitable for sentences such as ( 1 1 ) . 
( 1 1 )  Many lawyers are criminals, as compared to doctors .  
But what do we do with sentences that do not spel l  out a comparison set 
C? A framework eliciting missing arguments from context i s  the alterna tive 
semant ics for focus of Rooth [ 1 2] .  The idea is that an utterance of a sen­
tence specifies an expression in focus (written between brackets [ · ]F ) .  that is 
( somehow ) assigned a set A of alternatives . relat ive to which t he truth of 
the sentence is evaluated. For example, Lappin [ l O] 's interpretations of ( 1 1 )  
amount to an alternative semantics for ( 1 2b )  and ( 1 2c ) .  with the alternat ive 
set A = {doctors } .  
( 1 2 )  a .  There are many lawyers who are criminals .  
b .  There are many lawyers who are [criminals]F. 
c .  There are many [lawyers]F who are criminals. 
The matter becomes more complicated in case the set A of alternat ives has 
more than one element . This possibility is considered carefully in Babko [2] 's 
analysis of cardinal many  as a focus-sensit ive quant ifier. for which a bit of 
notat ion comes in handy. Let X be a formula with a free variable x .  such 
as lawyer( x )  1\ criminal( x ) .  and suppose e is a subexpression in X that is 
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in focus . Given an element a in the alternative set A, let X�  be the formula 
obtained by replacing e in X by a . 7  A simple proposal for when n X-x's can 
be deemed many (relative to A) is 
n X-x 's are many ( relative to A) iff ('Va E A) I { x  : x�} 1 < n . (x ) 
Babko dismisses (x) and any characterization that depends only on the car­
dinality of A and the number of a 's  in A for which I {x : x�} 1 < n .  Instead, 
she calculates a lower bound for n ,  using (in an essential way) the numbers 
I {x  : x: } 1 defined by alternatives a in A. And even then, she acknowledges 
"potential problems with such definitions . "  
Now, the relevance of this little digression to our analysis ( §2 )  is that if 
we introduce into the formula X a variable w for the world (taking intensions 
to extensions ) on which to apply [ ' IF (setting e to w ) , then our probabilistic 
proposals can be viewed as special cases of the alternative scheme above, where 
A is some set of possible worlds ( restricted in the case of §2 .2  to worlds meeting 
some condition imposed by the restrictor c.p in M a n y  x (  c.p, tP) ) .  Instead of (x ) , 
we have 
n X -x 's are many iff {a E A : I {x : x�} 1 < n}  is 
a " sizable" subset of A ( xi )  
for some notion of "sizable" subset defined by a probability function p and 
number c (or 0 ) . 8 By weakening the universal quantifier in (x ) , (xi )  reduces 
the demands on the context to specify A as precisely as it must under ( x ) .  
Within the alternat ive semantics o f  focus , our account is dist inguished by 
the application of [ ' I F  to an implicit intensional argument . This bit of inten­
sionality might be avoided by applying [ · JF  instead to an explic it argument . 
Babko st ates t hat 
. . .  t h e  alt ernative sem ant ics of foc u s  is all t h at is n eeded in order to 
ad eq u ately accou n t  for t h e  context-dependency of ' m an y '  and · fe w · .  
This  claim is somewhat unset t l ing t o the extent that (a )  the al ternat ive se­
mant ics of focus st ops at SOIlle presumed boundary between semant i cs and 
pragmatics .9 and ( b )  t he content ion that m a n y  is extens ional is defended by 
erec t i ng such borders . To our knowledge. Babko makes no such defense . She 
does consider a different analys is of m a n y  based on focus due to Herburger 
[ .5J . under which ·· t he card inal/ proport ional distinct ion does not coinc ide with 
Mi lsark 's st rong/weak dis t inc t ion :' and goes on to  write 
A basic argu ment for t h e  c a rd i n al/ proportional ambigu ity of " fe w "  and 
" m any ' ,  howpw r .  comes from l\ l ilsark "s o bservations about  t h e  weak 
c h aracter  of t hp c a rd i n al ' m an y "  and the strong n at u re of t h e  p ro por­
t ional one. T h e  presen t  an alysis preserves t h is i n sigh t ,  s ince all  weak 
i nterpretat ions of ' many '  and ' frw ' are considered to be card i nal and 
foc u s-affected .  whereas all proport ional read i n gs are strong .  
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But now consider the apparent asymmetry in certain there-insertion sentences 
such as ( 13ab) .  
( 13 )  a .  There are many lawyers who are criminals. 
b. There are many criminals who are lawyers .  
c .  Many lawyers are criminals. 
d. Many criminals are lawyers .  
Even if  an appeal is allowed to some topic/focus structure to transform ( 13a,b) 
to what amount to proportional readings of ( 1 3c,d) , it is difficult to resist 
the nagging sense that there is something wrong in insisting on the semantic 
principle that cardinal equals weak and proportional equals strong. only to fall 
back on pragmatics to account for (pragmatically innocent ) counter-examples 
of the form There are many A 's who are B 's .  
Turning our attention back to the case where A i s  a set of possible worlds, 
let us acknowledge that even in this case, general questions of (a) context­
dependence and of (b) where A comes from remain. Item (a) is taken up very 
briefly in the next section ; (b) in the section after that . 
3. 2. The fixed context assumption, extensionality, vagueness and ambiguity 
reconsidered 
Barwise and Cooper [3] ' s  "fixed context assumption" stating that .. t here is a 
rich context held fixed that determines the precise meaning for" ( among other 
expressions )  many is challenged above not only by the claim that extensions are 
not quite "rich" enough ( Claim 2 ) .  but also by our appeal . for an asymmetric 
reading. to context change, in  t he form of condit ionalization of probabi l it ies .  
Since th is  condit ional ization i s  local to the scope, one might want to d iscount 
this context change . and portray i t  as an ordinary case of context-dependence 
( whatever that amounts t o ) .  As we will see shortly. however . there could 
well be other s i t uat ions where condit ional izat ion i s  not local . At any rate .  the 
proposal above to ( re- ) analyze th e re are many C 's as many( \". C) (where \ '  can 
be read : "vacuous" ) i s  meant to  suggest t hat this context-dependence consists 
of some form of domain rest r ict ion ( relat ing the adject ival and determiner 
readings of many) .  
Describing context -dependence can ( needless t o  say )  b e  a tr i cky matter , 
even when the t ask is s imply to decide when it is that context resolves vague­
ness .  and when it is that it resolves ambiguity. As a first approx imat ion . one 
might say that vagueness has t o  do  with choosing the model against which t o  
evaluate a logical form: by cont rast . ambiguity concerns the choice o f  logical 
form ( to evaluat e ) .  S tated th i s  way. notions of vagueness and ambiguity pre­
suppose a fixed concept ion of logi cal form and model . That i s ,  the demarcat ion 
between vagueness and ambigui ty varies with d ifferent not ions of log ical form 
and model - which can get quite confus ing when it is not clear j ust what 
EXPECI1NG MANY 
can be put into the logical form. For example, adding the annotation [ ' ]F 
from Rooth [12] leads to (a) ambiguity because it can be attached to different 
expressions in a sentence, and to (b) vagueness insofar as there is a choice in 
the alternative set to interpret a fixed attachment . As for the probabilistic 
analyses presented above, the Intensionality Hypothesis in §2.3 says that the 
choice of c and a is up to the model, not the logical form (as c and a are 
independent of the arguments of many) . In that respect , the indeterminacy in 
c and a (as well as p) leads to vagueness ,  not ambiguity. 
That is not to say, of course, that ambiguity does not arise when using 
expectations. In addition to the cardinal/proportional ambiguity, there are 
various expectations to keep track of, leading to different readings . Consider 
sentence ( 14 ) ,  which would seem paradoxical under a reading of many as more 
than (could have been) expected. 
( 14) As expected, many students arrived today. 
Such a contradiction is easy enough to resolve along the following lines: the 
expectation underlying many above might concern arrivals on days other than, 
or in addition to, today ;  the expectation referred to in as expected pertains 
specifically to today. More generally, all kinds of probabilities might be in­
volved, conditionalized on, or applied to, any number of things . 
3. 3. Playing with expectations 
We close with a puzzle that begins by asking for lower bounds on many for 
each line of ( 1 5 ) .  
( 1 5 )  a .  Many people came to the  colloquium . 
b .  Chomsky spoke. Many people came to t he colloquium. 
c .  Tim spoke . l\lany people came to  the colloquium. 
Chances are i t  is easier to  p ick out  a number for ( 1 5b )  than for ( 1 5a ) .  and that 
t he number for ( 1 .5c ) is far lower than ( l .5b ) .  due to the acceptabi l i ty of ( 1 6 ) .  
( 1 6 )  a .  I f  Chomsky speaks .  many people wil l  come to t he colloquium . 
b .  If Tim speaks .  not many people wi l l  come to  t he colloquium. 
Now. the puzzle is t hat t he set  A of poss ible worlds on which n-is-manyx i s  
evaluated seems to change in ( l !lb ) and ( 1 .5c ) but not in ( 1 6a) or  ( 1 6b ) . 1 0 
Evident ly. A is not immune to the first sent ences in ( l .,) b )  and ( 1 .')c ) .  but 
escapes update by the antecedents in ( l 6a )  and ( J 6b ) .  
\Ve are not sure exact ly  how to  account for t h is discrepancy. One clue 
i s  that .  in contrast to ( 1 5 ) .  m a n y  is used in ( J 6 )  not to  report a part icular 
incident . but rather to express expectat ions. such as ( 1  i ) .  
( 1  i )  Many birds fly. 
65 
66 TIM FERNANDO AND HANS KAMP 
(Curiously, the expectations raised by ( 16)  would seem to work towards making 
( 1 5b) and ( 1 5c) equally likely - perhaps to increase their information content . )  
Just what the existential import of ( 16 )  or ( 1 7) i s  falls outside the scope of the 
present work, although it is easy enough to assign ( 16) and ( 1 7) a semantics 
where the existential quantification in line (v) of §2 has no counterpart . Alas , 
if we have stuck to line (v) , it is because we have tried not to stray too far 
away from uses of many considered in Partee [ 1 1 ] ,  where "meaning, once n or 
k i s  fixed, is clearly extensional." And even there we have failed. 
Endnotes 
fernando�ims . uni-stuttgart . de 
hans�ims . uni-stuttgart . de 
*Many thanks to Cleo Condoravdi for helpful discussions . 
lin any case, neither of us currently believes that the extensionality claim is 
correct . 
2 As argued in Kamp and Reyle [8] , NPs beginning with many do not introduce 
set discourse referents directly, but only via Abstraction, as in 
x 
x = L x . ( student(x)  A arr-t oday(x ) )  
Many(X) 
This i s  to make sure that the many phrase receives a distribut i ve interpreta­
t ion . For the d iscussions i n  this  paper. the difference is of no importance. 
3The term "possible world" may be somewhat misleading in  this context . for 
there are many cases where we th ink of the alternat ive s ituat ions in  terms of 
which the norm is determined as alternat ive s i tuat ions in the actual world .  
See in this connect ion §3 . 1 .  
4 I t  i s  possible that because we perceive that the norm strategy clearly makes 
no sense for a sentence l ike ( Sa ) . we are provoked into another interpretat ion 
strategy t hat is  more appropriate to it . Adding t he alternat ive possibi l ity as 
another disj unct to the t ruth clause may not be the optimal way of account ing 
for this .  We wil l  leave this problem to a companion paper which addresses the 
logic which our semant ics generates .  
5 As pointed out by C .  Condoravdi . the proposal to re-analyze th ere a re many  
C s as  many( � ·. C) .  rather than many (C. l" ) . can be  made without bringing in  
the  issue of intensionality. contrary to the presentat ion above . Sett ing inten­
sionality aside. one might ask whether the manner in which the arguments of a 
determiner are instantiated reflect s  more generally the weak/strong ambiguity 
of quant ifiers Q. In particular. does not the vacuous restrict ion i n  Q ( l". C) 
support (or otherwise relate to)  t he contention (e .g . .  in Zucchi [ 1 5] )  that weak 
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NPs are not subject to Heim [4] 's Descriptive Content Condition ( inasmuch as 
the only presupposition Q(V, C ) adds is that the universe V be non-empty)?  
Note that the interpretation of  the adjective many (under a weak existential 
reading) makes essential use only of the nuclear scope. By contrast , the re­
strictor plays an indispensable role for strong quantifiers such as most (e .g . , 
Kamp [7] ) and, under a proportional reading, many. 
6The word "subjective" in subjective probabilities suggests that the collec­
tion of possible worlds represents the doxastic alternatives entertained by an 
idealized logically omniscient agent , and that if we are to go beyond this ide­
alization, intensionality must give way to intentionality . .  
7 Interpreting many relative to extensional alternatives X� is faithful to Claim 
3 only insofar as X� resemble X, so that the switch ale could be viewed in­
tensionally as moving to a most "similar world" modulo ale . The question is 
would the word "expect ion" still be interesting after its meaning is stretched 
far enough to cover any such alternative semantics for many? 
80ur probabilistic approach constitutes a qualitative alternative to calculating 
the expectation E( t') of a random variable t' 
E(v )  = I > · p(r = n ) . 
The latter (quantitative )  approach comes closer to Babko's  aforement ioned 
lower bounds for n .  
9By contrast . let u s  cite Asher [ 1 ]  as a daring work that pushes t h e  analys i s  of 
context-dependence beyond such borders . 
1O\\'e are indebted here to R. Schwarz chi ld for asking how A rel a t es t o  t il < '  
not ion of common ground ( in say. Heim [4] ) .  
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